3. MARKET AND VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS

3.1 Theory

** Cornes and Sandler, chapter 5, "Pure Public Goods: Nash-Cournot Equilibrium and Pareto Optimality."

* Andreoni, James and Ted Bergstrom, "Do Government Subsidies Increase the Private Supply of Public Goods?," Public Choice, v. 88, 1996, 295-308.

* Bergstrom, Theodore, Laurence Blume and Hal Varian, "On the Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economics, 1986, v 29,25-49.

Varian, Hal R., "Sequential Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economics, 1994, 53, 165-86.

Bliss, C. and Barry Nalebuff, "Dragon Slaying and Ballroom Dancing: The Private Supply of a Public Good," Journal of Public Economics, Nov 1984 (25), 1-12.

Bilodeau, Marc and Al Slivinski, "Toilet Cleaning and Department Chairing: Volunteering a Public Service," Journal of Public Economics, February 1996, 299-308.

Andreoni, James, "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, December, 1989, 1447-1458.

Danziger, "A Graphic Representation of the Nash and Lindahl Equilibrium in a Economy with a Public Good," Journal of Public Economics, October 1976, pp. 295-308.

Warr, Peter, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution and Private Charity," Journal of Public Economics, 1982.

Bernheim, B. D., "On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods," American Economic Review, 1986.

Andreoni, James, "Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large Economy: The Limits of Altruism," Journal of Public Economics, February 1988, v 35, 57-73.

Andreoni, James, "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving," Economic Journal, 100, 1990.

McMillan, "The Free-Rider Problem: A Survey," Economic Record, June 1979.

3.2 Evidence-Experimental

*** Andreoni, James, "Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion," American Economic Review, Sept 1995, pp. 891-904. (Also available from Neely)

** Ledyard, "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," in Dagel and Roth, Handbook of Experimental Economics, 1995.

Glenn Harrison and Jack Hirshleifer, "An Experimental Evaluation of the Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, February 1989, pp. 201-25.

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Jeffrey E. Prisbey, "Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?," American Economic Review, December 1997, v. 87(5), 829-846.

Kim and Walker, "The Free-rider Problem: Experimental Evidence," Public Choice, 1984, pp 3-24.

Varian, "Sequential Contributions to Public Goods," Journal of Public Economics, February 1994, pp. 165-186.

Marwell, G. and Ruth Ames, "Economists Free Ride--Does Anyone Else?" Journal of Public Economics, 1981, 295-310.

Isaac, Mark and James Walker, "Group Size Hypothesis of Public Goods Provision: Experimental Evidence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1988.

Andreoni, James, "An Experimental Test of the Public Goods Crowding Out Hypothesis," American Economic Review, December 1993.

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Jeffrey E. Prisbrey, "Altruism, Reputation and Noise in Linear Public Goods Experiments," Journal of Public Economics, v. 61, 1997,March 1996, 409-427.

3.2. Evidence- Econometric Studies

*** Payne, Abigail, , "Does the Government Crowd_Out Private Donations? New Evidence from a Sample of Non_Profit Firms," Journal of Public Economics, v.69 (3), 1998, 323-345.

Berry, Steven T. and Joel Waldfogel, "Public Radio in the United States: Does it Correct Market Failure or Cannibalize Commercial Stations?," Journal of Public Economics, v.71, February 1999, 189-211.

Kingma, Bruce, "An Accurate Measure of the Crowd_out Effect, Income Effect, and Price Effect for Charitable Contributions," Journal of Political Economy, October 1989.